Dorrit Cohn Bibliography Mla

First Person Interior Monologues:
Narrative Distance and Chronology,
The Nation Thief and The Sound and the Fury

 

This paper was written as an assignment for ENGL 501R: MODERN AMERICAN NOVEL, Dr. Craig Barrow, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, 24 Apr. 1988.

© Bill Stifler, 1988

 

The distinction between interior monologues in third-person texts and first-person texts lies not in the proximity to the consciousness of the mind observed but in the nature of the mind observing. As Dorrit Cohn points out in Transparent Minds, "the direct expression of a character's thought [in third-person narration] will always be a quotation," in her terminology, a "quoted monologue" (Cohn 15).

First-person interior monologue, however, implies retrospection (Cohn 14), a re-creation of earlier memory, implying both a narrative distance from that earlier self and the possibility for a dynamic rearranging of memories. These two axes of chronology and narration yield a temporal range from sequential to associative, and a narrative range of a maximum distance between the narrating self and the experiencing self, and a zero limit where the narrating self is subsumed in the experiencing self (Cohn 183+) so that, in Joyce's words, "the reader finds himself established . . . in the thought of the principal personage, and the uninterrupted unrolling of that thought, replacing the previous form of narrative, conveys to us what the personage is doing and what is happening to him" (qtd. in Cohn 173).

Houston's The Nation Thief explores the distance between the narrating self and the experiencing self (chronology retaining its normal sequentiality). Not only does each narration appear as testimony to the question posed by Walker in the prologue [whether Walker is a hero or a monster (Houston x)], but each is personal testimony: a self-narration (Cohn 14) where the narrating self seeks to explain, defend, abrogate, justify, or absolve the actions and consciousness of the experiencing self.

This confessional tone is marked by numerous references by the narrators to unidentified audiences to their discourses: Guy Sartain's use of "sir" and "you" (Houston 6, 7, 11, 145, 190); Chelon's "muchachos" and "companeros" (Houston 12, 13, 15, 38, 89, 121, 206); Holdich's "gentlemen" (Houston 17, 24, 29, 95, 170); Hon. John Wheeler's "my friends" (Houston 78, 81, 137). This need for confession or justification is often an attempt to dissassociate the narrating self from the guilt associated with the experiencing self.

This dissonant self-narration (Cohn 145+) often appears early in a character's narration: Holdich--"I was twenty-three, you have to keep remembering that" (Houston 17); Sartain--"They have asked me, sir, why a Negro would want to go down there with William Walker. Well, first he wasn't then what he was later" (Houston 6). Even characters, who because of their lower social standing were less concerned with public opinion, reveal early misgivings: Warner--"Great God A'mighty, I wish I'd known some things then!" (Houston 5); Chelon--"It's true, God forgive the ignorance of a poor, fucked, fat Indian with a stiff leg" (Houston 12).

Houson uses the cumulative effect of these dissonant narrations, the ultimate individual breaks with Walker, and Walker's ultimate failure and incarceration appear like testimony in his trial creating an ironic distance between Walker's statement in the prologue "I have created William Walker in Central America" (Houston ix) and the pathos of "There should be more. He had imagined there would be more" (Houston 238). In the end, Walker is the silent witness to the narrative discourses of the novel, and judged by his peers, these testimonies serve as the bridge between his confident "he has not come to fear death" (Houston x) and the final "He had not thought there would be such terror" (Houston 238).

Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury emphasizes the chronological axis rather than the relationship of narrating self to experiencing self. In fact, the moment of locution remains ambiguous; the reader is unable to decide whether the narration occurs simultaneously with the action of the day or at the end of the day just prior to sleep (Cohn 250) [Cohn's identification of these monologues as memory monologues assumes the latter (Cohn 251)]. With regard to Quentin's monologue, Sartre even suggests the possibility of a post mortem origin (Cohn 316).

By using an automonous monologue for his characters, bracketed from the moment of narration, Faulkner is free to focus attention on the achronology of events in the narrator's mind, making these associations the "setting" for the story. This association of ideas--or "thought transferrences" as Faulkner referred to them (Cohn 251)--leave the monologues void of self-analysis or cause and effect relationships, shifting the focus away from the present moment back to the past. When Benjy snags his coat on the fence walking with Luster, he remembers a time when he caught his clothes on the fence walking with Caddy while delivering Uncle Maury's love notes (Faulkner 2). Passing the carriage house, Benjy remembers riding the carriage to the graveyard with T.P. (Faulkner 6). Quentin's fight with Gerald becomes his fight with Dalton Ames (Faulkner 115-128).

Bracketing the normal sequence of temporal causality, Faulkner forces the reader to discover meaning analogously within the consciousness of each narrator, that is, to discover the "why" of these associations of memories. In this way, the novel proceeds thematically rather than developmentally. Associations of cruelty and selfishness (Luster's, Maury's, Mrs. Compson's, Jason's), death (Damuddy's, Quentin's, Mr. Compson's, Roskus's) or sexuality (Caddy and the perfume, Caddy kissing Charlie, Benjy's castration, Caddy and Quentin's loss of virginity, Herbert, Gerald, Dalton Ames, Caddy's wedding) resonate within the text creating overtones of tension.

The final scene of the novel, the sense of order precariously restored in Benjy's mind, becomes a paradigm of the fall of the Compson family. Benjy, the broken flower of the family's destruction drooping in his hand, is trapped in a consciousness that can admit no change, where order is synonymous with stagnation and death (Faulkner 249).

 

Works Cited

Cohn, Dorrit. Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1978.

Faulkner, William. The Sound and the Fury. New York: Random House, 1956.

Houston, Robert. The Nation Thief. New York: Ballantine Books, 1984.

 

Progress in understanding speech and consciousness representation has been hampered by fundamental confusion about the concept of mimesis. Two senses of mimesis are regularly conflated: on the one hand, mimesis in the sense, derived ultimately from Plato, of the author’s speaking in a character’s voice rather than his own; on the other hand, mimesis in the sense of faithful reproduction of what we take to be reality. An unexamined assumption throughout much of the discussion of speech representation has been that mimesis in the sense of speaking for the character should correlate with mimesis in the sense of faithfulness of reproduction―that the more direct the representation was, the more realistic or life-like it would be (Sternberg Sternberg, Meir (1982). “Proteus in Quotation-Land: Mimesis and the Forms of Reported Discourse.” Poetics Today 3, 107–56.1982). Thus, DD should be the most faithful to reality, and ID the least, with FID somewhere in between. Nothing could be further from the truth; in fact, speech representation is a classic illustration of what Sternberg (Sternberg, Meir (1982). “Proteus in Quotation-Land: Mimesis and the Forms of Reported Discourse.” Poetics Today 3, 107–56.1982) decries as the fallacy of “package deals” in poetics whereby forms and functions are bundled together in one-to-one relationships. Actually, the forms of speech representation stand in a many-to-many relationship to their reproductive functions: some instances of DD are highly imitative of “real” speech, while others are deliberately stylized and un-mimetic; some instances of ID or FID are more imitative of “real” speech than DD often is, while other instances are less so; etc. (Fludernik Fludernik, Monika (1993). The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction: The Linguistic Representation of Speech and Consciousness. London: Routledge.1993: 312–15). Attempts to elaborate the three-category repertoire of speech representation into a continuous scale from maximally to minimally mimetic, in the faithfulness-of-reproduction sense (e.g. McHale McHale, Brian (1978). “Free Indirect Discourse: A Survey of Recent Accounts.” PTL: A Journal for Descriptive Poetics and Theory of Literature 3, 249–78.1978; cf. Genette Genette, Gérard ([1972] 1980). Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method. Ithaca: Cornell UP.1972), stumble at just this point. They invariably place DD (or FDD) at the most-mimetic pole and ID at the opposite pole. But no matter how many gradations such scales admit in between, they obscure the fact that degree of faithfulness does not correspond to formal categories: one scale cuts across the other.

Moreover, the very notion of “faithfulness to reality” here is highly suspect. Another of the unexamined assumptions of speech representation scholarship is that verbal narrative is better able to represent speech than anything else because narratives share one and the same medium, namely language (e.g. Genette [Genette, Gérard ([1972] 1980). Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method. Ithaca: Cornell UP.1972] 1980: 169–74). But this, too, is fallacious, as a glance at a transcription of spontaneous conversation would immediately confirm. At one level of analysis, conversation in novels may indeed reflect the “rules” of spontaneous real-world conversation (e.g. Toolan Toolan, Michael (1987). “Analysing Conversation in Fiction: The Christmas Dinner Scene in Joyce’s Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man.” Poetics Today 8, 393– 416.1987; Thomas Thomas, Bronwen (2002). “Multiparty Talk in the Novel: The Distribution of Tea and Talk in a Scene from Evelyn Waugh’s Black Mischief.” Poetics Today 23, 657– 84.2002; Herman Herman, David (2002). Story Logic: Problems and Possibilities of Narrative. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P.2002: 171–93). But at a finer-grained level, speech in the novel appears utterly unlike real-world speech. Novelistic speech is always highly schematized and stylized, depending for its effects of verisimilitude on very limited selections of speech-features, many of them derived not from actual speakers’ behavior but from literary conventions, linguistic stereotypes, and folk-linguistic attitudes. This is especially evident in representations of foreign accents, regional dialects, and specialized professional registers (Page Page, Norman (1973). Speech in the English Novel. London: Longman.1973). Perhaps the most powerful factor in producing effects of “realistic” speech is textual context, which induces the reader to accept thin sprinklings of conventional or possibly arbitrary features as faithful representations of real-world speech behavior (McHale McHale, Brian (1994). “Child as Ready-Made: Baby-Talk and the Language of Dos Passos’s Children in U.S.A.” E. Goodenough et al. (eds). Infant Tongues: The Voice of the Child in Literature. Detroit: Wayne State UP, 202–24.1994). In short, the mimesis of speech in fiction is a “linguistic hallucination” (Fludernik Fludernik, Monika (1993). The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction: The Linguistic Representation of Speech and Consciousness. London: Routledge.1993: 453); it depends on our willingness to play a “mimetic language-game” (Ron Ron, Moshe (1981). “Free Indirect Discourse, Mimetic Language Games and the Subject of Fiction.” Poetics Today 2.2, 17–39.1981).

If speech in fiction is not a faithful imitation but an effect produced by a combination of convention, selection, and contextualization, then this must also be the case for consciousness in fiction, only more so, for consciousness is at best only partly linguistic. Nevertheless, the operating assumption of much recent cognitivist work on consciousness in narrative is that fictional minds are modeled on real-world mental processes (e.g. Palmer Palmer, Alan (2004). Fictional Minds. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P.2004: 11). But what if consciousness in fiction is just as conventional, schematic, selective, and context-dependent as speech in fiction―just as much an effect, just as much a hallucination or language-game? Surely this is a hypothesis that ought to be entertained (Mäkelä Mäkelä, Maria (2006). “Possible minds: Constructing―and reading―another consciousness as fiction.” P. Tammi & H. Tommola (eds). FREE language INDIRECT translation DISCOURSE narratology. Tampere: Tampere UP, 231–60.2006).

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3.3 Voices

[18]

If speech representation always involves a quoting frame and quoted inset, this means that it involves two agents or instances of speech―two voices. The two voices are readily distinguished in DD and in content-paraphrase types of ID, but only with difficulty in FID. In FID, the effects of voice all seem to derive from the quoted character, with the narrator’s contribution reduced to the bare grammatical minimum of tense and person. Indeed, an early controversy in the scholarship on FID hinged on the question of the narrator’s putative self-effacement and empathetic identification with the character. However, FID is just as likely to serve as a vehicle of irony, and it is in these instances that the so-called dual-voice hypothesis (Vološinov Vološinov, Valentin (Voloshinov, Valentin) ([1929] 1973). Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. New York: Seminar P.1929; Baxtin Baxtin, Mikhail (Bakhtin, Mikhail) ([1929] 1984). Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P.1929; Pascal Pascal, Roy (1977). The Dual Voice: Free Indirect Speech and Its Functioning in the Nineteenth-Century European Novel. Manchester: Manchester UP.1977) seems most compelling. According to the dual-voice hypothesis, in sentences of FID (and some instances of ID) the voice of the narrator is combined with that of the character (hence “combined discourse”) or superimposed on it. “It partook, she felt, helping Mr. Bankes to a specially tender piece, of eternity”: in this famous sentence from To the Lighthouse, the parenthetical clause (“she felt, helping Mr. Bankes,” etc.) introduces a plane of narratorial comment that ironizes Mrs. Ramsay’s experience of eternity. (Or does it? This is actually an interpretative crux in the novel.) Irony of this kind seems best accounted for in terms of the dual-voice hypothesis (Uspenskij Uspenskij, Boris (Uspensky, Boris) (1973). A Poetics of Composition: The Structure of the Artistic Text and Typology of a Compositional Form. Berkeley: U of California P.1973: 102–5).

[19]

With the rediscovery of the Baxtin circle, the dual-voice analysis of FID, already anticipated by Vološinov (Vološinov, Valentin (Voloshinov, Valentin) ([1929] 1973). Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. New York: Seminar P.1929), came to be viewed in the light of wider phenomena of dialogue in the novel. According to Baxtin and his school, the text of the novel is shot through with more or less veiled dialogues between voices that “speak for” social roles, ideologies, attitudes, etc. The forms of dialogue range from outright parody and stylization to implicit rejoinders and veiled polemics (Baxtin Baxtin, Mikhail (Bakhtin, Mikhail) ([1929] 1984). Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P.1929). FID is folded in among these categories, reflecting as it does (according to the dual-voice hypothesis) the internal dialogization of the sentence of speech representation itself.

[20]

Related to the Baxtinian approach, but less ideologically driven, and capable of much finer-grained analyses, is Schmid’s model of Textinterferenz (Schmid, Wolf ([1973] 1986). Der Textaufbau in den Erzählungen Dostoevskijs. Amsterdam: Grüner.1973, Schmid, Wolf (2005). Elemente der Narratologie. Berlin: de Gruyter.2005: 177–221; see also Doležel Doležel, Lubomír (1973). Narrative Modes in Czech Literature. Toronto: U of Toronto P.1973; de Haard de Haard, Eric A. (2006). “On Narration in Voina i Mir.” Amsterdam International Electronic Journal for Cultural Narratology 3 <http://cf.hum.uva.nl/narratology/a05_haard.html>.2006). The Textinterferenz approach treats speech representation as a matter of interference or interaction between two texts, the narrator’s text and the character’s text. Textual segments display varying kinds and degrees of interaction between these two texts, depending upon how various features are distributed between the narrator’s and the character’s voices. These features include thematic and ideological (or evaluative) markers; grammatical person, tense and deixis; types of speech acts (Sprachfunktion); and features of lexical, syntactical and graphological style. In DD, all the markers point to the character’s voice. In ID, person, tense and syntax can be assigned to the narrator’s text, while thematic and ideological markers, deixis, and lexical style point to the character’s voice; the speech-act level points both directions. Finally, in FID, person and tense evoke the narrator’s text, while all the other features can be assigned to the character’s text.

[21]

In the light of dialogism and Textinterferenz, speech representation comes to be reconceived as only more or less discrete instances of the pervasive heteroglossia (→ Heteroglossia) of the novel, its multiplicity of voices (Baxtin Baxtin, Mixail (Bakhtin, Mikhail) ([1934/35] 1981). “Discourse in the Novel.” M. B. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Austin: U of Texas P, 259–422.1934/35). According to the Baxtinian account, samples of socially-inflected discourse―styles, registers, regional and social dialects, etc. with their associated attitudes and ideologies―are dispersed throughout the novel, appearing even where there is no frame/inset structure of quotation to “legitimize” or naturalize them. The language of a novel diversifies into various zones, including zones associated with specific characters, even in the absence of syntactical indications of quotation or paraphrase. This analysis of novelistic discourse was paralleled in the Anglophone world, albeit in a casual and pre-theoretical way, by Kenner’s (Kenner, Hugh (1978). Joyce’s Voices. Berkeley: U of California P.1978) jocular proposal of the “Uncle Charles Principle,” named after a typical sentence from Joyce’s Portrait of the Artist: “Uncle Charles repaired to the outhouse.” The sentence is attributable to the heterodiegetic narrator, but it is “colored” by Uncle Charles’ characteristic periphrasis, “repaired.” The Uncle Charles Principle, also called stylistic “contagion” or “infection” (Spitzer Spitzer, Leo ([1922] 1961). “Sprachmengung als Stilmittel und als Ausdruck der Klangphantasie.” L. S. Stilstudien II. München: Hueber, 84–124.1922; Vološinov ([Vološinov, Valentin (Voloshinov, Valentin) ([1929] 1973). Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. New York: Seminar P.1929] 1973: 133–36; Stanzel Stanzel, Franz K. ([1979] 1984). A Theory of Narrative. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.1979; Fludernik Fludernik, Monika (1993). The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction: The Linguistic Representation of Speech and Consciousness. London: Routledge.1993: 332–38), involves the dispersal of a character’s idiom into the narrative prose in the proximity of that character (Koževnikova Koževnikova, Natal’ja A. (1971). “O tipax povestvovanija v sovetskoj proze.” Voprosy jazyka sovremennoj russkoj literatury. Moskva: Nauka, 97–163.1971).

[22]

At the opposite extreme from the dual-voice hypothesis and its extensions is the controversial no-narrator hypothesis advanced by Banfield (Banfield, Ann (1982). Unspeakable Sentences: Narration and representation in the language of fiction. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.1982). According to Banfield, free indirect sentences of thought representation (though not of speech) in third-person hetereodiegetic contexts entirely lack a narrator, and so could hardly be dual-voiced. In effect, Banfield has revived the empathetic reading of FID endorsed by early commentators, but in a way calculated to scandalize anyone committed to a communications-model approach to narrative. Indeed, it might be argued that in certain FID representations of thought, those representing what Banfield calls non-reflective consciousness, there is no discernible voice at all: “It was raining, she saw” (Banfield Banfield, Ann (1982). Unspeakable Sentences: Narration and representation in the language of fiction. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.1982: 183–223; Fludernik Fludernik, Monika (1993). The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction: The Linguistic Representation of Speech and Consciousness. London: Routledge.1993: 376–79). Whereas sentences of reflective consciousness express what the character is aware of as passing through her mind―what she “thought to herself”―sentences of nonreflective consciousness express what the character perceives or apprehends without being aware of perceiving or apprehending. At this point, issues of voice shade off into even more diffuse issues of fictional minds.

   [23]

3.4 Minds

[24]

Pervasive voice in the novel is mirrored by a parallel pervasiveness of consciousness. Investigating the presence of fictional consciousness, cognitive narratologists have become impatient with the so-called “speech-category approach,” which in effect limits consciousness in fiction to varieties of inner speech. Not all consciousness in fiction is inner speech, they argue―perhaps relatively little of it. As we have already seen, however, even approaches to the representation of consciousness using speech categories eventually run up against phenomena that exceed those categories in various ways. Speech categories “bleed” at their edges, trailing off into less category-bound forms of fictional mind. At one edge, for instance, ID bleeds into psycho-narration, whereby the narrator takes charge of analyzing the character’s mind, including subconscious levels that might not be accessible to the character herself, or habitual dispositions that might not manifest themselves in inner speech. At the other edge, FID bleeds into nonreflective consciousness. Indeed, almost from the earliest days of scholarship on FID, it was recognized that the speech category of FID was intimately related to a form of so-called “substitutionary perception” (Fehr Fehr, Bernhard (1938). “Substitutionary Narration and Description: A Chapter in Stylistics.” English Studies 20.3, 97–107.1938; see also Bühler Bühler, Willi (1937). Die “erlebte Rede” im englischen Roman, ihre Vorstufen und ihre Ausbildung im Werke Jane Austens. Zürich: Niehans.1937), sometimes called “represented perception” (Brinton Brinton, Laurel (1980). “‘Represented Perception’: A Study in Narrative Style.” Poetics 9, 363–81.1980) or even “free indirect perception” (Palmer Palmer, Alan (2004). Fictional Minds. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P.2004): “She opened the door and looked out. It was raining harder. The cat would be around to the right. Perhaps she could go along under the eaves.” The third and fourth of these sentences are unmistakably FID (as indicated by the past-tense modals would and could, and the adverbial of doubt, perhaps), but the second is substitutionary perception.

[25]

Reorienting the study of represented consciousness away from speech categories opens up new areas of inquiry. For instance, characters can be shown to read each other’s minds―not in any science-fiction sense, but in the sense that they develop working hypotheses about what others are thinking, inferring interior states from speech and external behavior, just as one does in everyday life; they do “Theory of Mind,” in other words (Zunshine Zunshine, Lisa (2006). Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel. Columbus: Ohio State UP.2006). Indeed, all actions of characters in a narrative fiction must be animated by mental states or acts; otherwise, we might not be disposed to call them “actions” at all. So thought ought not to be viewed as separable from action, but rather as forming together with action a “thought-action continuum” whereby actions are animated by consciousness throughout (Palmer Palmer, Alan (2004). Fictional Minds. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P.2004: 212–14).

[26]

The most radical statement of this reorientation of analysis away from the speech-category approach and toward “mind in action” must surely be Fludernik’s redefinition of narrativity itself as experientiality (Fludernik Fludernik, Monika (1996). Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology. London: Routledge.1996: 20–43; compare Antin Antin, David (1995). “The Beggar and the King.” Pacific Coast Philology 30, 143–54.1995). According to Fludernik’s account, narrativity is not adequately defined in terms of sequences of events or even in terms of causal connections among events, but only in terms of the experiencing of events by a human (or anthropomorphic) subject. In other words, it is ultimately the presence of consciousness that determines narrative, and not anything else.

[27]

This is a far cry from the carving up of blocks of prose into discrete units labeled DD, ID, FID. Nevertheless, it is not as unprecedented a development as some cognitive narratologists have claimed. For instance, the analysis of informational gaps and gap-filling, as practiced by exponents of the Tel Aviv school (Perry & Sternberg Perry, Menakhem & Meir Sternberg ([1968] 1986). “The King Through Ironic Eyes: Biblical Narrative and the Literary Reading Process.” Poetics Today 7, 275–322.1968; Perry Perry, Menakhem (1979). “Literary Dynamics: How the Order of a Text Creates its Meaning.” Poetics Today 1.1–2, 35–64, 311–61.1979), is every bit as finely attuned to characters’ ventures in mind-reading and the thought-action continuum as anything to be found in the new cognitivist narratology (Palmer Palmer, Alan (2004). Fictional Minds. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P.2004: 182; → Cognitive Narratology). But if cognitive narratology sometimes overestimates its own novelty and underrates its precursors, this does not prevent it from standing at the cutting edge of research into the representation of fictional mind at the present time.

   [28]

4 Topics for Further Investigation

[29]

(a) One is tempted to recommend (albeit facetiously) a moratorium on further research into FID proper until other, more diffuse and pervasive effects of mind and voice in fiction are better understood. Among other advantages, this might give us the opportunity to evaluate critically some of the bold claims of the cognitive narratologists with respect to fictional minds, and of the Baxtin school with respect to “dialogue” (→ Dialogism). Baxtin, in particular, has become a victim of his own (posthumous) success; serial (mis)appropriations of his approach by a diverse range of literary and cultural theories, coupled with uncritical endorsement of his ideological positions, has made critical evaluation of his account of dialogue virtually impossible. (b) Too little is still known about the role of models (schemata, stereotypes, folk-linguistic knowledge, etc.) in the production and recognition of representations of language varieties (styles, dialects, registers, etc.) in fiction. (c) Similarly, there is still much that remains to be clarified about the operation of textual context and its interaction with models of speech and thought in producing the effect or illusion of mimesis (though with respect to context see Ehrlich Ehrlich, Susan (1990). Point of View: A Linguistic Analysis of Literary Style. London: Routledge.1990). (d) “Currently, there is a hole in literary theory between the analysis of consciousness, characterization, and focalization […] a good deal of fictional discourse is situated precisely within this analytical gap” (Palmer Palmer, Alan (2004). Fictional Minds. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P.2004: 186). Palmer perhaps underestimates the quantity and value of the work that has already gone into knitting together consciousness, characterization and focalization. Nevertheless, he is basically right: this is one of the holes that remain in narrative theory, and closing it should be a high priority of future research.

   [30]

5 Bibliography

   [31]

5.1 Works Cited

  • Antin, David (1995). “The Beggar and the King.” Pacific Coast Philology 30, 143–54.
  • Bally, Charles (1912). “Le style indirect libre en français moderne I et II.” Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift 4, 549–56, 597–606.
  • Banfield, Ann (1982). Unspeakable Sentences: Narration and representation in the language of fiction. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
  • Baxtin, Mikhail (Bakhtin, Mikhail) ([1929] 1984). Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P.
  • Baxtin, Mixail (Bakhtin, Mikhail) ([1934/35] 1981). “Discourse in the Novel.” M. B. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Austin: U of Texas P, 259–422.
  • Bickerton, Derek (1967). “Modes of Interior Monologue: A Formal Definition.” Modern Language Quarterly 28, 229–39.
  • Brinton, Laurel (1980). “‘Represented Perception’: A Study in Narrative Style.” Poetics 9, 363–81.
  • Bühler, Willi (1937). Die “erlebte Rede” im englischen Roman, ihre Vorstufen und ihre Ausbildung im Werke Jane Austens. Zürich: Niehans.
  • Cohn, Dorrit (1969). “Erlebte Rede im Ich-Roman.” Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift 19, 305–13.
  • Cohn, Dorrit (1978). Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction. Princeton: Princeton UP.
  • Coulmas, Florian, ed. (1986). Direct and Indirect Speech. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
  • de Haard, Eric A. (2006). “On Narration in Voina i Mir.” Amsterdam International Electronic Journal for Cultural Narratology 3 <http://cf.hum.uva.nl/narratology/a05_haard.html>.
  • Doležel, Lubomír (1973). Narrative Modes in Czech Literature. Toronto: U of Toronto P.
  • Ehrlich, Susan (1990). Point of View: A Linguistic Analysis of Literary Style. London: Routledge.
  • Fehr, Bernhard (1938). “Substitutionary Narration and Description: A Chapter in Stylistics.” English Studies 20.3, 97–107.
  • Fludernik, Monika (1993). The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction: The Linguistic Representation of Speech and Consciousness. London: Routledge.
  • Fludernik, Monika (1996). Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology. London: Routledge.
  • Friedman, Melvin (1955). Stream of Consciousness: A Study in Literary Method. New Haven: Yale UP.
  • Genette, Gérard ([1972] 1980). Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method. Ithaca: Cornell UP.
  • Hagenaar, Elly (1992). Stream of Consciousness and Free Indirect Discourse in Modern Chinese Literature. Leiden: Centre of Non-Western Studies.
  • Herman, David (2002). Story Logic: Problems and Possibilities of Narrative. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P.
  • Humphrey, Robert (1954). Stream of Consciousness in the Modern Novel. Berkeley: U of California P.
  • Kalepky, Theodor (1899). “Zur französischen Syntax.” Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie 2, 491–513.
  • Kalepky, Theodor (1913). “Zum ‘style indirect libre’ (‘verschleierte Rede’).” Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift 5, 608–19.
  • Kenner, Hugh (1978). Joyce’s Voices. Berkeley: U of California P.
  • Koževnikova, Natal’ja A. (1971). “O tipax povestvovanija v sovetskoj proze.” Voprosy jazyka sovremennoj russkoj literatury. Moskva: Nauka, 97–163.
  • LaCapra, Dominick (1982). Madame Bovary on Trial. Ithaca: Cornell UP.
  • Leech, Geoffrey N. & Michael H. Short (1981). Style in Fiction: A Linguistic Introduction to English Fictional Prose. London: Longman.
  • Lerch, Eugen (1914). “Die stylistische Bedeutung des Imperfektums der Rede (‘style indirect libre’).” Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift 6, 470–89.
  • Lips, Marguerite (1926). Le Style indirect libre. Paris: Payot.
  • Lorck, Etienne (1914). “Passé defini, imparfait, passé indefini I, II et III.” Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift 6, 43–57, 100–13, 177–91.
  • Mäkelä, Maria (2006). “Possible minds: Constructing―and reading―another consciousness as fiction.” P. Tammi & H. Tommola (eds). FREE language INDIRECT translation DISCOURSE narratology. Tampere: Tampere UP, 231–60.
  • McHale, Brian (1978). “Free Indirect Discourse: A Survey of Recent Accounts.” PTL: A Journal for Descriptive Poetics and Theory of Literature 3, 249–78.
  • McHale, Brian (1983). “Unspeakable Sentences, Unnatural Acts: Linguistics and Poetics Revisited.” Poetics Today 4, 17–45.
  • McHale, Brian (1994). “Child as Ready-Made: Baby-Talk and the Language of Dos Passos’s Children in U.S.A.” E. Goodenough et al. (eds). Infant Tongues: The Voice of the Child in Literature. Detroit: Wayne State UP, 202–24.
  • Page, Norman (1973). Speech in the English Novel. London: Longman.
  • Palmer, Alan (2004). Fictional Minds. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P.
  • Pascal, Roy (1977). The Dual Voice: Free Indirect Speech and Its Functioning in the Nineteenth-Century European Novel. Manchester: Manchester UP.
  • Perry, Menakhem (1979). “Literary Dynamics: How the Order of a Text Creates its Meaning.” Poetics Today 1.1–2, 35–64, 311–61.
  • Perry, Menakhem & Meir Sternberg ([1968] 1986). “The King Through Ironic Eyes: Biblical Narrative and the Literary Reading Process.” Poetics Today 7, 275–322.
  • Ron, Moshe (1981). “Free Indirect Discourse, Mimetic Language Games and the Subject of Fiction.” Poetics Today 2.2, 17–39.
  • Schmid, Wolf ([1973] 1986). Der Textaufbau in den Erzählungen Dostoevskijs. Amsterdam: Grüner.
  • Schmid, Wolf (2005). Elemente der Narratologie. Berlin: de Gruyter.
  • Spitzer, Leo ([1922] 1961). “Sprachmengung als Stilmittel und als Ausdruck der Klangphantasie.” L. S. Stilstudien II. München: Hueber, 84–124.
  • Stanzel, Franz K. ([1979] 1984). A Theory of Narrative. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
  • Steinberg, Günther (1971). Erlebte Rede: ihre Eigenart und ihre Formen in neuerer deutscher, französischer und englischer Erzählliteratur. Göppingen: Kümmerle.
  • Sternberg, Meir (1982). “Proteus in Quotation-Land: Mimesis and the Forms of Reported Discourse.” Poetics Today 3, 107–56.
  • Tammi, Pekka & Hannu Tommola, eds. (2006). FREE language INDIRECT translation DISCOURSE narratology: Linguistic, Translatological and Theoretical Encounters. Tampere: Tampere UP.
  • Thomas, Bronwen (2002). “Multiparty Talk in the Novel: The Distribution of Tea and Talk in a Scene from Evelyn Waugh’s Black Mischief.” Poetics Today 23, 657– 84.
  • Tobler, Adolf (1887). “Vermischte Beiträge zur französischen Grammatik.” Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie 11, 433–61.
  • Todemann, Friedrich (1930). “Die erlebte Rede im Spanischen.” Romanische Forschungen 44, 103–84.
  • Toolan, Michael (1987). “Analysing Conversation in Fiction: The Christmas Dinner Scene in Joyce’s Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man.” Poetics Today 8, 393– 416.
  • Toolan, Michael (2006). “The ‘irresponsibility’ of FID.” P. Tammi & H. Mommola (eds). FREE language INDIRECT translation DISCOURSE narratology. Tampere: Tampere UP, 261–78.
  • Ullmann, Stephen (1957). “Reported Speech and Internal Monologue in Flaubert.” St. U. Style in the French Novel. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 94–120.
  • Uspenskij, Boris (Uspensky, Boris) (1973). A Poetics of Composition: The Structure of the Artistic Text and Typology of a Compositional Form. Berkeley: U of California P.
  • Vološinov, Valentin (Voloshinov, Valentin) ([1929] 1973). Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. New York: Seminar P.
  • Zunshine, Lisa (2006). Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel. Columbus: Ohio State UP.

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5.2 Further Reading

  • Ginsburg, Michal Peled (1982). “Free Indirect Discourse: A Reconsideration.” Language and Style 15, 133–49.
  • Hernadi, Paul (1972). “Appendix: Free Indirect Discourse and Related Techniques.” P. H. Beyond Genre: New Directions in Literary Classification. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 187–205.
  • Lintvelt, Jaap ([1981] 1989). Essai de typologie narrative. Le ‘point de vue’. Theórie et analyse. Paris: Corti.
  • Neumann, Anne Waldron (1986). “Characterization and Comment in Pride and Prejudice: Free Indirect Discourse and ‘Double-Voiced’ Verbs of Speaking, Thinking, and Feeling.” Style 20, 364–94.
  • Patron, Sylvie (2009). Le narrateur. Introducion à la théorie narrative. Paris: Armand Colin.
  • Rivara, René (2000). La langue du récit: Introduction à la narratologie énonciative. Paris: L’Harmattan.

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